HONESTY WITHOUT TRUTH: LIES,
ACCURACY, AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PROCESS
Lisa Kern Griffin†
Focusing on “lying” is a natural response to uncertainty
but too narrow of a concern. Honesty and truth are not the
same thing and conflating them can actually inhibit accuracy.
In several settings across investigations and trials, the
criminal justice system elevates compliant statements,
misguided beliefs, and confident opinions while excluding
more complex evidence.
Error often results.
Some
interrogation techniques, for example, privilege cooperation
over information. Those interactions can yield incomplete or
false statements, confessions, and even guilty pleas.
Because of the impeachment rules that purportedly prevent
perjury, the most knowledgeable witnesses may be
precluded from taking the stand. The current construction of
the Confrontation Clause right also excludes some reliable
evidence—especially from victim witnesses—because it
favors face-to-face conflict even though overrated demeanor
cues can mislead. And courts permit testimony from forensic
experts about pattern matches, such as bite-marks and
ballistics, if those witnesses find their own methodologies
persuasive despite recent studies discrediting their
techniques. Exploring the points of disconnect between
honesty and truth exposes some flaws in the criminal justice
process and some opportunities to advance fact-finding,
truth-seeking, and accuracy instead. At a time when
“post-truth” challenges to shared baselines beyond the
courtroom grow more pressing, scaffolding legal institutions,
so they can provide needed structure and helpful models,
seems particularly important. Assessing the legitimacy of
legal outcomes and fostering the engagement necessary to
reach just conclusions despite adversarial positions could
also have an impact on declining facts and decaying trust in
broader public life.
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INTRODUCTION
Identifying and coping with lying has become a central
focus of public discourse. And the institutions of criminal
justice provide a natural setting in which to evaluate the effects
of that priority. In a setting where advocates dispute issues
within a formal set of rules and resolving epistemic uncertainty
is the stated goal, we can look closely at the role of “honesty”
in discovering “truth.” And it turns out that acquiescence to
law enforcement, honest mistakes, and sincere but misguided
beliefs can all generate enduring errors. A binary approach to
the value of evidence also tends to exclude the more nuanced
and challenging testimony that might offer a more complete
picture of events.
Critically evaluating the systematic premium on “not lying”
helps explain why errors persist. Even when an eyewitness
identification is manipulated, a jailhouse snitch’s testimony
induced, or a suspect’s confession coerced, police and
prosecutors uncritically accept the evidence as accurate
because they view it as usefully candid.
And, after a
conviction, it is virtually impossible to clarify a statement, to
recant successfully, or to overcome faulty forensic evidence.
Moreover, during trials, the arcane rules surrounding
credibility determinations may silence essential testimony.
Defendants are often precluded from testifying because they
can be impeached with any prior convictions in order to alert
jurors to their potential to commit perjury. Out-of-court
statements by unavailable victims are also excluded because
of a preoccupation with fact-finding as an in-person clash or
confrontation.
Some of the ways in which we enforce honesty thus keep
us from finding the truth. Bad-faith witnesses may tell
outright lies, but good-faith witnesses will also make mistakes.
Being honest—which generally means not intentionally stating
falsehoods—seems a relatively simple proposition. There is a
distinction, however, between “not lying” and “producing
truth,” and it is one that criminal procedure often overlooks.
Seeking accurate results through criminal investigation and
adjudication is not simple at all. It requires costlier and more
complex procedures than only identifying lies.
Of course, “truth” in adjudication refers neither to
transcendence nor to the verifiable findings of a setting like a
laboratory. Truth-seeking in court involves the culling and
arranging of facts “in such a way as to allow conclusions,
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decisions, agreements.”1 Though adversaries may speak of
“truth-telling” by individuals and of “wanting the truth” from
witnesses on the stand,2 rarely will a single source reveal the
whole picture. One cannot see all that occurred before power
corrupted, an intimate relationship soured, a corporate actor
took an uncalculated risk, the chaos of a terrible accident
unfolded, or violence welled up. The truth of these things is a
liquid rather than a line. It cannot be told all at once or traced
to one data point. It is not conveyed so much as collected and
contained. What emerges from the adjudicative process is thus
a substitute. The outcome stands for the truth, much as
money is accepted as a substitute for value and calendars and
clocks purport to measure the concept of time. Juries reach
verdicts, judges enter convictions, and legal truth results.
I rely here on the same assumption that the law itself
makes—that there is such a thing as facts, incomplete and
imperfect, but also real and important. The formal result of
adjudication does not capture the full substantive truth but
aims for close correspondence. In the process, factfinders
should conclude “of what is that it is, and of what is not that
it is not,” with as much precision as possible.3 To do that, to
reliably reach a verdict, requires broad engagement with data
and testimony that increase knowledge. Regarding the process
as too binary—too dependent on determining who has lied—
can constrain inputs in a way that diminishes accuracy and
narrows the aperture on “what happened.”
Lying and getting things wrong overlap to some extent, but
their fundamental gear mechanisms are different. All lies are
false, but not all falsehoods are lies. For one thing, some
parties honestly make completely inaccurate statements.
More than a quarter of Americans would tell you with great
conviction that the sun orbits the earth.4 The lying eyes of
good faith witnesses who identify perpetrators provide another
example. One study concluded that fully three quarters of

1 STEVEN LUBET, NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH: WHY TRIAL LAWYERS DON’T,
AND SHOULDN’T HAVE TO TELL THE WHOLE TRUTH 196 (2001).
2 See, e.g., A FEW GOOD MEN (Castle Rock Entertainment 1992).

CAN’T,

3 This phrasing references Aristotle’s correspondence theory of truth.
Marian David, The Correspondence Theory of Truth, in THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall 2016 ed.),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/#Bib
[https://perma.cc/4MK2-PQMF].
4 Eleanor Barkhorn, What Americans Don’t Know About Science, ATLANTIC
(Feb.
15,
2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2014/02/what-americansdont-know-about-science/283864/ [ https://perma.cc/6PW6-EHX2].
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wrongful convictions are connected to mistaken eyewitness
identifications.5 Though they provide compelling testimony
declaring that a defendant committed the crime, and believe
what they say, many eyewitnesses are being honest without
telling the truth. Moreover, the FBI analyst who claimed “100
percent” certainty when erroneously matching Oregon lawyer
Brandon Mayfield’s fingerprints to a latent print at the site of
the Madrid terrorist bombing could not have been more sincere
at the time.6
Honesty can play a part in the search for legal truth but is
not sufficient. And legal truth can capture true propositions
external to the investigative and adjudicative processes, but it
never includes the full factual truth of any event.7 This Essay
considers how the definition, detection, and deterrence of
dishonesty can occasionally widen the distance between legal
and factual truth. Interrogation techniques designed to get
suspects to talk can yield false and incomplete, albeit
forthcoming, confessions.
Impeachment rules aimed at
precluding perjury often mean that the most knowledgeable
witnesses cannot take the stand. The current construction of
the Confrontation Clause right excludes some evidence
because it privileges face-to-face confrontations even though
demeanor cues can be profoundly misleading. And forensic
experts can introduce subjective conclusions about pattern
matches when they appear authoritative or find their own
methodologies compelling. The sections that follow explore the
potential for “true lies” and “honest inaccuracies” in each of
these contexts, as well as the broader implications of
recognizing a distinction between truth and honesty.
I
INTERROGATIONS AND THE FORTHCOMING SUSPECT
In some instances, interviewing suspects and obtaining
their cooperation advances truth-seeking, but too often
interrogations focus exclusively on a suspect’s perceived
honesty and ignore critical information. Law enforcement
5 BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 48 (2011).
6 See David Stout, Report Faults F.B.I.’s Fingerprint Scrutiny in Arrest of
Lawyer,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
17,
2004),
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/17/politics/report-faults-fbis-fingerprintscrutiny-in-arrest-of-lawyer.html [https://perma.cc/7ATD-7H8D].
7 See, e.g., William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REV.
329, 336-37 (1995) (“As each successive stage of the criminal process is carefully
considered, there is only slight interest in and consideration of an accused’s
factual innocence.”).
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agents want suspects to talk but have a preconceived notion of
what they will say. They tend to ask questions only after they
have concluded that a suspect is guilty.8 In fact, many police
officers confidently assert that they “do not interrogate
innocent people.”9 Nor do they test competing hypotheses once
they have recorded a witness statement consistent with the
theory of the case or extracted a confession that will ensure an
efficient clearance rate.10 Overcoming silence and prompting
speech—sometimes even planting a false script to be
repeated—takes precedence over actually investigating what
happened.
These encounters enforce a version of honesty that really
consists of compliance and cooperation. Law enforcement
agents confuse the thing they are doing—making suspects
speak—with the thing they really want, which is accurate
information. They draw the target around the hit they get and
assume a confession is reliable in every case because they
want what they are hearing to be true and stop seeking the
truth itself. Common practices that can undercut accuracy
include guilt-assuming inquiries, prolonged interrogations,11
proffering false inculpatory evidence,12 tainting interrogations
with non-public information, and suggesting an exit strategy
in exchange for a suspect’s willingness to follow the script.13
Many of these problematic techniques date back to the 1960s
and the wide adoption of the police manual authored by Inbau
and Reid.14 The manual advises maintaining cramped and
isolated interview rooms and applying psychological pressures
to elicit statements.15 It replaced true custodial violence—the
physically coercive tactics that were known as the “third
degree”16—but it substituted new forms of procedural violence.

8 See Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put
Innocents at Risk?, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 215, 216 (2005) (describing the process
an officer uses to determine whether a person is a suspect or witness, and thus,
whether the officer should more thoroughly interrogate that person).
9 Id.
10 See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel
Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 316.
11 See Lisa Kern Griffin, Silence, Confessions, and the New Accuracy
Imperative, 65 DUKE L.J. 697, 699 (2016).
12 See George C. Thomas III, Regulating Police Deception During Interrogation,
39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1293, 1296-1301 (2007).
13 See DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 198 (1991).
14 FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (5th ed.
2011).
15 See id. at 88 (describing how to elicit a “full response” from a suspect).
16 See RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 62–64
(2008).
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Although the Supreme Court recognized and critiqued the
manual’s instructions for soft coercion as long ago as the 1966
Miranda decision,17 the basic protocols for interacting with
suspects have changed little over the past fifty years.18
This remains the case despite a well-documented
connection between interrogation techniques and wrongful
convictions. The West Memphis Three, the Norfolk Four, and
the Central Park Five, for example,19 are all notorious cases in
which young, vulnerable, and disadvantaged defendants were
irreparably damaged by their own false confessions. Poorly
educated and mentally unstable defendants are especially
susceptible to agreeing with law enforcement’s version of
events in order to end the ordeal of questioning.20 Their plight
has become more visible as more law enforcement agencies
record interrogations, and serialized true crime stories also
make that footage accessible to the public. In the recent
documentary series, The Confession Tapes, police induce false
confessions by commanding that suspects “say it and be done
with it,” insisting that they “open their minds” and “come
around,” and suggesting that they just “close their eyes” and
repeat what police have told them.21
Suspects deny
responsibility for hours on the recordings but eventually
succumb to the narratives that law enforcement agents
advance.
Some suspects wrongly assume that the adjudicative
process will later confirm their innocence, but for others, the
admissions are “coerced-internalized” confessions, and they
become convinced that they must have committed the crime.22
One episode of The Confession Tapes shows a defendant,
confronted with an array of false evidence against him,
concluding “I guess I might have did it then.”23 The Netflix
17

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448-58 (1966).
See DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PROCESS 121–22, 311 n.11 (2012).
19 See, e.g., TOM WELLS & RICHARD A. LEO, THE WRONG GUYS: MURDER, FALSE
CONFESSIONS, AND THE NORFOLK FOUR (2008).
20 Saul M. Kassin, A Critical Appraisal of Modern Police Interrogations, in
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING: RIGHTS, RESEARCH AND REGULATION 207, 216 (Tom
Williamson ed., 2006).
21 The Confession Tapes: The Labor Day Murders (Netflix Sept. 8, 2017).
22 See, e.g., Kassin, supra note 20, at 207 (discussing the prevalence and
risks of false confessions in criminal proceedings).
23 The Confession Tapes: A Public Apology (Netflix Sept. 8, 2017); Andrew
Knapp, Wesley Myers “Broken” After Admitting for 2nd Time to North Charleston
Killing He Insisted He Didn’t Commit, POST & COURIER (Oct. 8, 2017),
https://www.postandcourier.com/news/wesley-myers-broken-after-admittingfor-nd-time-to-north/article_717aa5c2-a874-11e7-bcce-bf50eea5ada5.html
18
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documentary Making a Murderer similarly portrays Brendan
Dassey—sixteen years old and with an IQ in the
mid-seventies—accepting his involvement in a murder in slow
motion after hours of detectives pleading with him, planting
information, and persuading him that he will not face
punishment for telling them “what [they] already know.”24
It was once inconceivable that innocent people would
confess to crimes. But now it is undeniable that they do,25
often because of this single-minded focus on whether suspects
are forthcoming and apparent indifference to the accuracy of
what they say.
Reforms, such as non-confrontational
interviews and prohibitions on police lying, could change that.
But they seem unlikely until seeking information (truth)
becomes more important than obtaining a confession
(perceived honesty). A first step would be for courts and law
enforcement to recognize the potential distinction between
those two things.
II
IMPEACHMENT AND THE DEFENDANT WITNESS
Part of the leverage police and prosecutors use to make
defendants more forthcoming pretrial comes from the silencing
effect of impeachment rules at trial. When suspects become
trial defendants, they are no longer encouraged to speak. In
fact, because of concerns that they will lie, evidentiary rules
tend to preclude their testimony altogether. The federal rules
of evidence have a stated purpose: “ascertaining the truth and
securing a just determination.”26 To achieve that end, the rules
tend to favor the admission of evidence and factfinders’ receipt
of information. One of the most controversial rules, however,
has the opposite effect and constrains potential testimony by
defendants.
All testifying witnesses—including criminal
defendants—may face questioning about their past felony
convictions.27 Any crime, the reasoning goes, portends a
willingness to violate the social contract, and thus a propensity

[https://perma.cc/4M63-QRLD].
24 Making a Murderer: Indefensible (Netflix Dec. 18, 2015); see Dassey v.
Dittman, 201 F.Supp.3d 963, 967 (E.D. Wis. 2016), aff’d, 860 F.3d 933 (7th Cir.
2017), vacated, 877 F.3d 297 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
25 See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions
in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 901 (2004) (describing challenges to
the “conventional wisdom that innocent people are never convicted in the
American criminal justice system”).
26 FED. R. EVID. 102.
27 FED. R. EVID. 609.
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to commit perjury as well.28
About a million criminal
defendants pass through the criminal justice system every
year, and all but 25,000 of them say almost nothing to anyone
in court apart from entering a guilty plea.29 Yet engagement
with defendants may provide the best opportunity to determine
what happened in any case.
Until the late nineteenth century, defendants were not
examined under oath so as not to force the choice of
“self-accusation, perjury, or contempt.”30
Jurors, it was
thought, would never believe an interested party anyway, and
allowing them to testify only endangered the important
“presumption that all sworn evidence is truthful.”31 This
limitation has been lifted, along with the common-law
prohibition against felons offering testimony.32
But the
prospect of impeachment has virtually the same effect.
Journalists have a norm—or at least they used to—against
labeling individuals liars across contexts.33 There is no such
norm in court.
Witnesses get called liars all the time.
According to the logic of the impeachment rules, there is such
a thing as just “being a liar,” and jurors ought to know when
any “liar” is testifying. Of course, the reasoning fails at several
points. Because of the breadth of the criminal code and the
prevalence of plea bargaining resolutions, past felony
convictions do not necessarily signal knowing violations of
legal norms.34 And even past crimes involving clear intent and
express acts of dishonesty will not necessarily predict lying
under oath. Social psychology long ago moved beyond the trait
theory on which the rule’s rationale depends and recognized

28 See Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts
Opened the Door to Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior Convictions, 42
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 301 (2008).
29 See Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants,
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 1458 (2005).
30 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
31 George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 625
(1997).
32 See id. at 656–58.
33 See, e.g., Reed Richardson, Mainstream Media Still Won’t Tell the Truth
About
Trump’s
Lies,
SALON
(Nov.
30,
2017),
https://www.salon.com/2017/11/30/mainstream-media-still-wont-tell-thetruth-about-trumps-lies/ [https://perma.cc/BH6Z-S9QV] (“Within the stilted
framework of mainstream news ‘objectivity,’ the simple act of calling out ‘lies’ or
‘lying’ by a politician—especially a president—is now taboo. . . . [T]he use of these
words to identify a documented falsehood is now considered controversial,
partisan, inflammatory, unfair.”).
34 See Anna Roberts, Conviction by Prior Impeachment, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1977,
1995 (2016).
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the influence of situational pressures.35 Moral conduct in one
particular scenario does not portend an identical response in
a different one.
The rules of evidence largely preclude
prosecutors from drawing an inference from character to
conduct.36 Yet pointing to a witness’s general lack of integrity
remains a permissible way to discredit testimony.
The practice purports to equip jurors with a tool to discern
dishonesty. It is a blunt instrument, however, and one they do
not particularly need. Of course, guilty defendants will “choose
to testify about anything that might improve their chances and
about which they might imagine they can be persuasive,” and
for all of them “acquittal is the overriding, intensely desired,
goal.”37 Frankly, jurors know that, and in some jurisdictions,
they also get an instruction urging special caution with a
defendant’s testimony.38 As one might anticipate, jurors rarely
rely on convictions as evidence of credibility. The experimental
work on Federal Rule of Evidence 609 suggests instead that
prior convictions impact perceived likelihood that the
defendant committed the charged offense.39 Empirical data on
testifying defendants also reveals that past crimes like perjury
are not the most damaging to their chances of acquittal.
Rather, the more similar a prior crime is to the crime charged,
the more perilous it is to testify.40
Of course, many defendants are best advised to stay silent
throughout trial, but some need and want to participate. A
defendant witness “vindicate[s] her view of justice as against
the views of others.”41 Even if the testimony involves some
dissembling, that introduces a “culturally productive”
contradiction42 when the jury then weighs it against other
evidence and determines whether the witness’s memory,
judgment, and descriptive powers are fallible and whether the
35 See Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered:
Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949, 964 (2006).
36 See FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
37 H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing
Through the Liar’s Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 813 (1993).
38 See Sixth Cir. Pattern Crim. Jury Instructions § 7.02B (updated as of Dec.
20, 2017); Pattern Crim. Jury Instructions of the Seventh Cir. § 3.01 (2012 ed.).
39 See John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior
Record—Lessons from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477,
486, 490 (2008).
40 See Ric Simmons, An Empirical Study of Rule 609 and Suggestions for
Practical Reform, 59 B.C. L. REV. 993, 1013 (2018).
41 Norman W. Spaulding, The Artifice of Advocacy: Perjury and Participation
in the American Adversary System, in LAW AND LIES: DECEPTION AND TRUTH-TELLING
IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 81, 139 (Austin Sarat ed., 2015).
42 See id. at 138.
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story has credibility. Moreover, lying that does occur will often
follow truthful revelations.43 Defendant testimony may be
imperfect, but it is also available, efficient, and a unique source
of information.
And sorting through any omissions,
exaggerations, or shadings implicates exactly the set of skills
jurors supposedly bring to the courtroom. Yet concern with a
defendant’s complete honesty often precludes any testimony at
all. The rule thus privileges lie prevention over a truth-seeking
opportunity.
Nor is accuracy the only thing at stake—fairness to the
defendant also suggests the need for some space within which
to construct a counter-narrative. As the Supreme Court has
recognized, the defendant “above all others may be in a
position to meet the prosecution’s case.”44 A defendant bearing
witness has more impact than the testimony of “the police, of
informants, of co-defendants, and of expert witnesses.”45
Without testifying, defendants stand little chance of
persuading a jury.46 Because alerting jurors to prior criminal
conduct increases the chances of a guilty verdict, a defendant
with criminal history effectively cannot testify.
The rule not only codifies a stereotype about felons but
also imposes further collateral consequences of past
convictions. Defendants are more likely to bargain away their
trial rights and plead guilty if a criminal record will keep them
off the stand.
Testifying also impacts a defendant’s
subsequent reintegration,47 and the chance to hear from a
defendant can enable understanding and recovery for victims
as well. Letting people tell their stories, even horrible ones,
can fuel reconciliation. Penalizing defendants so that they will
never do so represents a poorly-reasoned decision. It reveals
all the criminal conduct in a defendant’s past that may or may
not suggest a tendency to lie rather than encourage testimony
that can offer the most complete, and ultimately the most
truthful picture of the events surrounding the crime charged.48

43 See Evelyne Debey, Jan De Houwer & Bruno Verschuere, Lying Relies on
the Truth, 132 COGNITION 324, 331 (2014).
44 Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 582 (1961).
45 Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand:
The Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial
Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1370 (2009).
46 See Barbara Allen Babcock, Introduction: Taking the Stand, 35 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1, 12 (1993).
47 See Anna Roberts, Reclaiming the Importance of the Defendant’s Testimony:
Prior Conviction Impeachment and the Fight Against Implicit Stereotyping, 83 U.
CHI. L. REV. 835, 873 (2016).
48 See Dan Simon, Criminal Law at the Crossroads: Turn to Accuracy, 87 S.
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III
CONFRONTATION AND THE SUBSTANCE OF STATEMENTS
A different form of credibility concern—one grounded in
the constitutional right to “confront” the evidence against
you—has sometimes silenced victim witnesses too.
Cross-examination has taken on new significance in
contemporary trials, as the salience of the oath requirement
has declined. When it was widely believed that lying under
oath meant eternal damnation, there was no real need for
veracity cues or tests.49 But courts now seek to both inform
and equip jurors to identify “liars” while observing their
testimony, and that includes the complaining witnesses for the
prosecution.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.”50 Evidentiary rules already exclude many statements
made by out-of-court speakers, but there are exceptions based
on the necessity or reliability of particular hearsay evidence.
The Supreme Court formerly interpreted the Confrontation
Clause to allow the use of evidence that fell within
well-established exceptions to the hearsay ban or otherwise
possessed “indicia of reliability.”51
In a series of cases
beginning in 2004, the Court expanded the constitutional
requirement and declared that all witnesses must be available
for cross-examination if their out-of-court statements
constitute “testimonial” ones offered against a defendant.52
Accounts by victims that would otherwise fit within hearsay
exceptions fall into that category, including statements under
oath in formal settings like the grand jury.
Among the hundreds of defendants exonerated by DNA
evidence in recent decades, there is not one whose wrongful
conviction rested on “unconfronted hearsay,” which is
regularly excluded by the current construction of the rule
announced in Crawford.
Meanwhile, flawed eyewitness
testimony, false confessions, and faulty forensics are rarely
screened out because they contain perceived indicators of
honesty. In other words, we are preferring evidence that

CAL. L. REV. 421, 438 (2014).
49 See Frederick Schauer, Can Bad Science Be Good Evidence? Neuroscience,
Lie Detection, and Beyond, 95 CORNELL L. REV 1191, 1194 (2010).
50 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
51 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980).
52 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004).
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clearly causes wrongful convictions and excluding statements
jurors have shown themselves well equipped to evaluate.
To find out what happened, the best source will often be a
direct witness, testifying live, under oath, and subject to
cross-examination. In fact, that is all the more reason to have
rules that allow criminal defendants to testify. But what about
when a witness has died, or disappeared, or now refuses to
talk? When the firsthand account is not available, sometimes
the earlier statement constitutes the only source of
information, and sometimes it has been tested in ways that
reinforce its accuracy. Yet the definition the Court now uses
to determine which statements fall into the testimonial
category sets aside reliability and focuses exclusively on the
significance of a performative opportunity to confront
witnesses in person.
The requirement that defendants “look an accuser in the
eye” precludes admission of hearsay assertions if they tend to
accuse or have the capacity to condemn.
If a victim’s
statement is testimonial—even when it is made to a first
responder, medical professional, social worker, counselor,
friend, or family member—then it may be inadmissible. That
can lead to silencing victims when their only available
statements come after the most fearful encounters, including
in domestic violence scenarios. When a witness is available,
in-court testimony ought to be required. But what about when
it is not possible? In that case, the preference for confrontation
in the form of a verbal duel or ritual staring contest does
silence victims.
One example comes from a 2008 Wisconsin case in which
Mark Jensen was convicted of murdering his wife Julie by
poisoning her with antifreeze.53 He claimed she committed
suicide, but the strongest evidence against him was a letter she
gave to a neighbor before her death describing her terror and
her certainty that Mark was intent on killing her. “I am
suspicious of Mark’s behaviors,” she wrote, “[and] fear for my
early demise.” The letter also disclaimed any intention to
commit suicide because of her love for her children. The jurors
who convicted Mark in his first trial saw the letter and
commented later that it was a “clear road map” to his
conviction.54
The letter’s admission, however, was a
Confrontation Clause violation that later jeopardized the

53

See State v. Jensen, 794 N.W.2d 482, 490 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010).
See Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 284
(2013).
54
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verdict.
To be sure, any such document has some
self-impeaching qualities, and the jury might have seen it as
consistent with Mark’s claim that Julie was despondent about
an affair and plotted to kill herself and frame him as revenge.
Factfinders, however, could readily observe the letter’s defects
even without Julie on the witness stand.
Its exclusion
illustrates misplaced confidence in confrontation itself as a test
of deception.
What the Court has called the “irreducible literal
meaning”55 of confrontation—which is to stare a witness
down—actually serves only a limited purpose. Justice Scalia
regarded his opinions on the Confrontation Clause as his most
significant legacy.56
In them, he repeatedly referenced
“something deep in human nature” that requires the
“essential” physical presence of an accusing witness.57 While
the fairness dimensions of confrontation hold up to scrutiny,
its role in assuring reliability does not. Looking at someone
does not help to detect deception and might even hinder it. As
the experimental evidence indicates, “ordinary observers do
not benefit from the opportunity to observe nonverbal behavior
in judging whether someone is lying.”58 Moreover, “there is
little correlation between people’s confidence in their ability to
detect deception and their accuracy.”59
In fact, almost every non-verbal cue of dishonesty is
subject to conflicting interpretations.60 Both blinking too
much and not blinking supposedly indicate lying. The same
goes for staring and avoiding eye contact, talking too fast and
choosing words too deliberately, having inconsistencies in a
narrative and keeping the story straight, smiling and frowning,
and fidgeting and sitting rigidly still. Showing obvious nerves,
sweating, slumping, and eye-darting—clinical studies
suggest—are as likely to be the result of the stress of the
courtroom situation as of effortful lying.61
Accordingly,

55

See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015-19 (1988).
See Marcia Coyle, Antonin Scalia’s “Profound” Influence on the Supreme
Court,
NAT’L
L.J.
(Feb.
14,
2016),
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/1202749718827/?slreturn=2
0180119171453 [https://perma.cc/67XE-SG5U].
57 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1017.
58 Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1088 (1991).
59 Adam J. Kolber, Will There Be a Neurolaw Evolution?, 89 IND. L.J. 807, 837
(2014).
60 See, e.g., Dan Simon, The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 VAND.
L. REV. 143, 176-77 (2011).
61 See
Margaret Talbot, Duped, NEW YORKER (July 2, 2007),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/07/02/duped
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cross-examination has the potential to mask truth, as well as
reveal it. Occasionally, it will highlight unmistakable signs of
falsehood, but it can also make honest witnesses appear
hesitant, confused, or defiant, and thereby mislead the
factfinder to reject truthful evidence.
Popular culture perpetuates the myth that confrontation
will yield a smoking gun or telltale sign. Countless magazine
articles list techniques for identifying the liars in your social
and professional circles with behavioral cues. The television
series Lie to Me popularized the theory of detecting deception
through observing micro-expressions. Recent books, like
Liespotting, promise to reveal the “single most dangerous
expression to watch out for in business and personal
relationships.”62 And, in Spy the Lie, “former CIA officers teach
you how to detect deception” by observing behavior.63 This
concept surfaces as well in just about every police manual.
Seventy-eight percent of police officers report that they make
veracity judgments based on nonverbal cues like “gaze
aversion.”64 Nonverbal cues work in some contexts—detecting
social status, appraising sexual desire, recognizing personality
traits—but they do not reliably signal deception.
The most useful confrontation in terms of arriving at the
larger truth in a case has more to do with getting answers than
just asking questions. Some out-of-court statements excluded
by the Confrontation Clause—especially written ones or
recorded testimony—provide a much richer opportunity to test
the substance of proffered facts for inconsistencies and
contradictions. It takes more effort to evaluate substance than
to observe behavior, but it yields more information.65 And that
opportunity is what the Confrontation Clause broadly
guarantees: a criminal defendant’s right “to know, to examine,

[https://perma.cc/3N27-AVCR] (“People who are afraid of being disbelieved, even
when they are telling the truth, may well look more nervous than people who are
lying.”).
62 The author concludes that the danger signal emerges from any expression
of “contempt,” which could appear in a “wrinkle in the nose, eye rolling, or a
raised nostril combined with a curled upper lip.” PAMELA MEYER, LIESPOTTING:
PROVEN TECHNIQUES TO DETECT DECEPTION 68 (2010). These expressions—like,
apparently, any other asymmetrical gesture—are described by Meyer as masks
because “[n]atural truthful gestures typically occur evenly on both sides.” Id. at
60.
63 PHILIP HOUSTON, MICHAEL FLOYD & SUSAN CARNICERO, SPY THE LIE (2013).
64 Aldert Vrij, Nonverbal Detection of Deception, in FINDING THE TRUTH IN THE
COURTROOM: DEALING WITH DECEPTION, LIES, AND MEMORIES 163, 165 (Henry
Otgaar & Mark L. Howe eds., 2018).
65 See Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence, Procedure, and the Upside of
Cognitive Error, 57 STAN. L. REV. 291, 335 (2004).
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to explain[,] and to rebut” the evidence against her.66
Well-documented statements can be verified given other
evidence and context. Several experiments have demonstrated
that transcripts are superior to live testimony when it comes
to making credibility judgments.67
Recorded statements
actually eliminate the distracting and distorting nonverbal
data and underscore verbal content. Moreover, out-of-court
statements are more likely to be unprepared and unrehearsed.
Of course, firsthand witnesses are better than secondhand
ones, when they are available. And, of course, some unique
secondhand testimony presents real dangers of unfairness or
inaccuracy. But a secondhand account that supplements
other evidence may be preferable to denying the factfinder
information altogether, and in too many cases, the idea that all
statements must be tested by adversarial combat excludes
them.
The prohibition persists because confrontation, as Justice
Scalia redefined it, is a formal rather than a functional
process.68 To be faced down and to appear forthcoming
satisfies the standard, while the quality of the information
obtained and its relationship to accuracy is irrelevant.69
Accordingly, a witness on the stand and in the chair, even with
no memory of the relevant events, meets the constitutional
requirement.70
Although the Confrontation Clause plays an important role
in excluding statements that may have been influenced by
government actors, it does not make trials more accurate—or
ultimately more truthful exercises—to silence victim witnesses
whose statements contain essential information and whose
motivations can be assessed from the record.71 Mistakenly

66 Daniel H. Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress,
8 J. PUB. L. 381, 402 (1959).
67 See, e.g., Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo, Individual Differences
in Judging Deception: Accuracy and Bias, 134 PSYCHOL. BULL. 477, 483 (2007).
68 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (stating that the Confrontation
Clause “commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed
in a particular manner”).
69 See Joyce Plotnikoff & Richard Woolfson, “Kicking and Screaming”: The
Slow Road to Best Evidence, in CHILDREN AND CROSS-EXAMINATION: TIME TO
CHANGE THE RULES? 21, 22 (John R. Spencer & Michael E. Lamb eds., 2012)
(“[C]ross-examination aims not at accuracy or best evidence but at persuading
witnesses to adopt an alternative version of events or discrediting their
evidence.”).
70 United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 560 (1988).
71 See David Alan Sklansky, Confrontation and Fairness, 45 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 103, 108 (2012).
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regarding cross-examination as an assurance of honesty has
resulted in some poor sorting of testimony. The durable myth
of demeanor as a lie detection tool persists, despite its potential
to distort, and that myth can also impede truth-seeking by
supporting the exclusion of some necessary and reliable
witness statements.
IV
FORENSIC FACTS AND FALSE PRECISION
A related truth-seeking issue has arisen with regard to
forensic testimony, which at first seems like the one form of
evidence from which we might expect empirical clarity. With
evidence that is supposedly scientific, we might worry less
about accuracy, but recent developments suggest that we
should actually worry more.
A frequently quoted line
attributed to Mark Twain reminds us that “it isn’t what you
don’t know that gets you into trouble but what you know for
sure that just ain’t so.” A version of that quotation served as
the on-screen epigraph to two recent films: The Big Short,72
which exposes the economic fallacies that drove the recent
financial crisis, and An Inconvenient Truth,73 which documents
the effort to raise awareness of scientific facts about climate
change. It was sourced to Mark Twain in both places, but
Twain did not say it.74 The instability of both content and
context calls to mind one of the most powerful “broken system”
stories about criminal justice in recent years: the discovery
that while many methods have been presented as scientifically
certain, they just were not so.
For decades, and with respect to some techniques for
almost a century, courts have allowed expert testimony about
superficial pattern matches that link known samples to data
collected in criminal investigations. The standard by which the
courts measure the reliability of this expertise—codified in
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and known as the Daubert
standard—continues to place particular weight on whether
other experts in the field rely on similar methodologies. That
is, whether it is “generally accepted”75 and “peer reviewed.”76

72

THE BIG SHORT (Paramount Pictures 2015).
AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH (Paramount Classics 2006).
74 Nineteenth century humorist Josh Billings seems to have originated the
saying. JOSH BILLINGS, EVERYBODY’S FRIEND, OR JOSH BILLING’S ENCYCLOPEDIA AND
PROVERBIAL PHILOSOPHY OF WIT AND HUMOR 286 (1874) (“I honestly beleave it iz
better tew know nothing than two know what ain’t so.”).
75 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 584 (1993).
76 Id. at 594; see also FED. R. EVID. 702.
73
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Within professional communities of interest, however, an
honest commitment to the validity of expert analysis turns out
to have little to do with its truth or reliability. Experts who
make their livings or their reputations with the same
technique—members of the Association of Firemark and
Toolmark Examiners, for example—may share a sincere belief
that a method works, but they are often mistaken. Moreover,
they may profit handsomely from purveying the expertise even
when they have doubts about its utility. These Associations
have internal publications as well, and ones that are often cited
to support the peer-review factor. But publishing there
amounts to “talk within congregations of true believers” and
does not allow the critical review and disinterested assessment
that the Daubert Court envisioned.77
Although firearm and toolmark analysts have long stated
that their discipline has “near-perfect” accuracy, the most
recent studies indicate a high false-positive rate. Missing
context for forensic testimony also matters. Experts can testify
honestly that a certain gun could have fired a bullet or that a
particular screwdriver could have made the pry marks on a
door. But they cannot make that assertion to the exclusion of
other guns or tools. So, they can testify to something that is
plenty precise as far as it goes but hazards inaccuracy by
leaving out the larger picture.78 It would be the equivalent of
stating that an alleged perpetrator’s DNA was found at the
scene of a crime without explaining that the suspect actually
lives in the house.
Fingerprint analysis further illustrates the way in which
labels conveying reliability tend to stick. Another guild of
forensic examiners claims the ability to match latent prints
from a crime scene to identified samples, with a high degree of
certainty. For the most part, courts admit fingerprints because
they have always admitted fingerprints; they consider them the
archetype of reliability because they have been used as
evidence for roughly 100 years.79 Prints do display some
distinctive ridge patterns from the loops and arches of the
human fingertip, but there is no science supporting
77 David H. Kaye, How Daubert and Its Progeny Have Failed Criminalistic
Evidence and a Few Things the Judiciary Could Do About It, 86 FORDHAM L. REV.
1639, 1645 (2018).
78 See, e.g., Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm
Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892, 895 (2005) (concluding
that traditional forensic identification sciences rely on untested assumptions and
semi-informed guesswork).
79 See Nancy Gertner, Commentary on the Need for a Research Culture in the
Forensic Sciences, 58 UCLA L. REV. 789, 790 (2011).
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conclusions about how likely or unlikely particular sets of
features are to repeat in different individuals. Moreover, the
most common fingerprinting method has no standard test
protocols and relies on subjective assessments of similarities.
When experts testify to matches, however, courts have been
“unable to muster the most minimal grasp of why a
standardless form of comparison might lack evidentiary
reliability or trustworthiness.”80
Courts continue to permit such testimony despite a
shattering National Academy of Sciences report in 2009 that
concluded that the forensics based on what’s called “pattern
matching” or “feature comparison” fall well short of scientific
standards. The discredited techniques include handwriting
analysis, bite-marks, ballistics, footwear and tire impressions,
tool marks, voice prints, microscopic hair comparison, blood
spatter, textile fibers, and burn patterns in arson cases.81
None of it is supported by scientific validity, or at least there
has not been sufficient scientific testing to validate its
reliability.82 A subsequent 2016 report by the President’s
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) further
enumerated the lack of validation studies and the urgent need
for reform in forensic analysis and testimony.83
That is not to say that pattern comparison is irrelevant
across the board—it just is not as scientific as it purports to
be. As the PCAST report details, empirical studies do not
establish that these methods are repeatable, reproducible, and
accurate.84 They do not yield a binary “match” or “non-match”
because choices factor heavily into the analysis. Prosecutors
may present them as unassailable, but they rely on subjective
human judgment about which features to compare and how to
determine if they are sufficiently similar. In some cases,
factfinders could even receive the data, hear a basic
explanation, make comparisons, and draw conclusions about
the probabilities themselves.

80 Erin Murphy, Neuroscience and the Civil/Criminal Daubert Divide, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 619, 624 (2016).
81 See COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY., NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A
PATH FORWARD 189 (2009).
82 Id. (concluding that “[l]ittle rigorous systematic research has been done to
validate” these “basic premises and techniques” of forensic pattern matching).
83 See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY
OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 86–120 (2016) (noting observed false positive
rates that render these methods scientifically unreliable).
84 Id.
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In its reasoning, the Daubert Court recognized that science
is a process rather than a collection of facts, and that the
explanations it offers about the world are subject to further
testing and refinement. The Daubert rule that followed from
the opinion, however, does not do enough to exclude unreliable
expert testimony, and it is now widely regarded as too vague to
support accurate screening.85 In practice, trial judges rarely
reject forensic testimony offered by prosecutors in criminal
cases, and it takes decades for scientific advances to find
acceptance and expression in court. And, although appellate
courts may closely screen scientific evidence admitted by trial
judges in civil cases, they almost never overturn rulings on
forensics in criminal cases.
To accommodate the competing languages of science and
law, the Daubert rule emphasizes flexibility about how to
assess reliability.86 Over time, that flexibility has meant too
much emphasis on the measures that are most familiar to
courts, like precedents that have accepted particular
techniques or the training, experience, and qualifications of
experts. “Each ill-informed decision becomes a precedent
binding on future cases.”87 Most courts functionally apply the
pre-Daubert standard from Frye, which rewards the sincerity
of the proponent’s belief in the value of the evidence. They even
regard past testimonial descriptions of accuracy as an “implicit
history of testing.”88 Here the preference for honesty manifests
itself as an affinity for recognizing authority.
Experts who are convincing, commanding, or just honestly
committed to a methodology are thus permitted to testify even
when their testimony does not meet the standards of rigor,
reliability, and accuracy that Daubert purports to require.89
And they are too often allowed to state that their methodologies
definitively establish that a defendant was present at a crime
scene, when they may be relying on assumptions and making

85

See Kaye, supra note 77, at 1642.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993); see also
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999).
87 Harry T. Edwards, Senior Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, Reflections on the Findings of the National Academy
of Sciences Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science
Community
(Feb.
3,
2014),
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/EdwardsSpeechtoNCFS.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5FUS-VHVV].
88 See United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 241 (3d Cir. 2004).
89 See United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 278 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael, J.,
dissenting) (critiquing reliance on the “dogged certainty” of fingerprint examiners
to admit their testimony).
86
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estimations that can produce error rates comparable to the
false identifications made by lay eyewitnesses.
Moreover, using scientific vocabulary to state conclusions
that may be imprecise or contain motivated reasoning might
be truth-hindering in a broader sense.
A recent study
estimated that intuitive error rate measurements for scientific
experts range from 1 in 100,000 to 1 in 10,000,000.90 And
experiments involving jury simulations reveal that an expert’s
credentials and confidence matter more than the substance of
scientific testimony to the jury’s assessment of credibility.
Meanwhile, about 60% of the documented wrongful
convictions have occurred in cases that involved this sort of
identification or feature-comparison evidence.91 This is a
serious misalignment between assumptions about forensic
expertise and its tested reliability. Recognizing that the sincere
commitment of forensic experts does not necessarily yield
accurate testimony could at least widen the avenues to
challenge it, with ample alternative explanations, probing
questioning, competing experts, and careful assessments of
suspect methodologies by courts.
V
THE APPEAL OF LIE DETECTION
To overcome some of the conceptions of honesty that cause
error, we have to understand where they originated. They
intersect, as it happens, with a longstanding and still-evolving
challenge to Daubert: lie detection itself. The possibility of an
accurate and scientific way to identify deception has been
discussed since the early 1900s. And it has contributed to the
notion that lying or not lying is a binary distinction, and that
the right procedure can expose whether the lever has moved.
A 1907 New York Times article predicted that “[a] few years
hence, no innocent person will be kept in jail, nor, on the other
hand, will any guilty person cheat the demands of justice.”92
That still has not happened, of course. Lie detection has thus
far been almost universally excluded from trials because of its
high error rate and potential to mislead the jury (although a

90 See Jonathan J. Koehler, Intuitive Error Rate Estimates for the Forensic
Sciences, 57 JURIMETRICS J. 153, 153 (2017).
91 Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony
and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009).
92 Invents Machine for “Cure of Liars”: Professor Munsterberg Experiments to
Reduce Knowledge of Truth to a Science, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 1907), cited in
GEOFFREY C. BUNN, THE TRUTH MACHINE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE LIE DETECTOR
100 (2012).

2018]

HONESTY WITHOUT TRUTH

42

suspect’s willingness to submit to polygraphs can be deemed
relevant evidence of state of mind).
Developing technologies like functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) might change the status of lie
detection in court. Conventional polygraph tests, which fail
the Daubert test for reliability, measure external stress
responses and rely on a few measures of arousal. fMRI uses
thousands of data points per subject and looks for cognitive
processes inside the brain that indicate the effort and intent to
deceive.93
As it proceeds through further testing and
validation, fMRI poses closer and closer questions under
Daubert and might ultimately meet the standard for admission
and be a regular subject of expert testimony. If detecting lies
ever looks more like DNA testing than demeanor assessments,
that will raise new questions about the place of lie detection in
the larger search for truth.
The allure of lie detection by any method begins with the
adversarial system to which we are committed. It stresses
testimony by the parties rather than an inquisitorial process
in which the courts take a more active role in investigation. In
theory, truth emerges in an adversarial system from the
market forces of conflict and competition at trial and not just
from some neutral inquiry into what happened.94 But in
practice, adversarial process is “error-prone in a world of
unequal resources.”95
Inquisitorial systems have deeper
institutional competencies in determining historical facts and
an explicit mandate to identify ground truths.96 In contrast,
adversarial trials are uniquely and sometimes entirely reliant
on the reports of witnesses rather than primary investigation
by the trier of fact. Accordingly, they feature this “structured
process for the determination of the credibility of strangers,
many of whom will, for one reason or another, try to deceive
those who rely upon their word.”97 That process emphasizes
honesty and depends on internal rather than external validity,
which can confound truth-seeking.
The substance of criminal law further reinforces these
93 See Martha J. Farah et al., Functional MRI-based Lie Detection: Scientific
and
Societal
Challenges,
15
NATURE
123
(Jan.
20,
2014),
https://www.nature.com/articles/nrn3665 [https://perma.cc/SU94-U565].
94 See David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634,
1690-91 (2009).
95 Christopher Slobogin, Lessons from Inquisitorialism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV.
699, 713 (2014).
96 See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of
Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1588 (2005).
97 Uviller, supra note 37, at 776.
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structural choices by imposing broad liability for lies about
offenses. There are approximately 4,000 federal crimes, and
about 300 of them have something to do with deception,
including perjury, the various obstruction offenses, and
making false statements in investigations.98 The criminal
justice system not only sorts and labels liars but also sends
messages about the prevalence of lying itself. From celebrity
athletes to high-flying financiers, notorious defendants like
Barry Bonds and Bernie Madoff have faced liability for lying.99
And prosecutors have charged an expanding range of
defendants with nothing but dishonesty in the context of an
investigation. It was once thought unsporting to pursue a
charge for lying about wrongdoing if the proof was not available
on the underlying offense. But now lying charges are a
common device to elicit cooperation, enforce governmental
authority, or just expediently close a case. And the variations
on liability for dishonesty in the criminal code mean that many
suspects expose themselves to easy charges as soon as they
engage with investigators.100
The fundamental impenetrability of intent in a complex
case makes these charges especially attractive. When liability
turns on the wrongfulness with which a defendant acted,
factfinders must “infer the mental state of a defendant they do
not know as he acted in a way they did not see.”101 Prosecutors
find it less demanding to assert that a defendant simply said
something false, as that requires less “sift[ing] through the
surface level of conduct for signals about internal mental
processes.”102 When investigators regard a suspect’s lie as
something observable, and courtroom rules supposedly
“detect” dishonesty, factfinding appears to stand on much
firmer ground.
That desire for certainty also helps explain the intense
interest in detecting dishonesty well beyond the courtroom.
Fascination with lying has its roots in the frustrations of the
intersubjectivity divide. Between people and even those they
98

18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2018).
See JAMES B. STEWART, TANGLED WEBS: HOW FALSE STATEMENTS ARE
UNDERMINING AMERICA: FROM MARTHA STEWART TO BERNIE MADOFF 265, 363
(2011).
100 See Eric Posner, The Lying Game, NEW REPUBLIC (May 29, 2011),
http://www.newrepublic.com/book/review/tangled-webs-james-stewart
[https://perma.cc/JHS3-9ZMB].
101 Francis X. Shen et al., Sorting Guilty Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306, 1307
(2011).
102 Samuel W. Buell & Lisa Kern Griffin, On the Mental State of Consciousness
of Wrongdoing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 153 (2012).
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know the best and love the most, there will always be a
barrier.103 No path leads directly into someone else’s thoughts,
and thus assurances of accurate expressions of the content of
another’s mind fill a basic need. Trusting others is essential
to survival.104
Navigating through the world requires
communication, implicit trust in the information that is
transmitted, and sustainable social relationships. A classic
study of the 1960s surveyed participants on 555 different
personality traits, and the one that rated 555th on the list was
“liar.”105
Yet perceived honesty again suffices—in our
“hypersocial” network of relationships, what feels forthcoming
often rates as more satisfying than what rationality suggests is
accurate.
Despite the evolutionary imperative to trust, lying seems
to be everywhere.106 It is ordinary human behavior and even a
necessary stage of development. “By inventing deceptions and
withholding information, children establish boundaries
between self and others, test the limits of adult power and
control, and move toward independent thought and action.”107
Adults then lie with ease and frequency, to both strangers and
intimates. The consequences of lies range from devastating to
benign, but there is no question that people lie a lot, for many
reasons: job applicants seeking advantage, classmates and
colleagues making excuses, potential romantic partners
hoping to impress.108
For all the interest in deception—across popular culture,
103 See Joel Krueger, Seeing Mind in Action, 11 PHENOMENOLOGY & COGNITIVE
SCI. 149, 149–51 (2012) (discussing the empirical problem of other minds and
“the use of our own mental states to imaginatively simulate what another person
is likely thinking and feeling”); see also Susan C. Johnson, The Recognition of
Mentalistic Agents in Infancy, 4 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 22, 22 (2000) (“Mental
states, and the minds that possess them, are necessarily unobservable
constructs that must be inferred by observers rather than perceived directly.”).
104 See Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, Why We Lie: The Science Behind Our Deceptive
Ways,
NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC
(June
2017),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2017/06/lying-hoax-falsefibs-science/ [https://perma.cc/PX3P-TENB].
105 Megan Garber, The Lie Detector in the Age of Alternative Facts, ATLANTIC
(Mar.
29,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2018/03/the-liedetector-in-the-age-of-alternative-facts/556685/
[https://perma.cc/UYR5247A].
106 Jessica Bennett, The Truth Is, We’re All Raging Liars, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 25,
2009),
http://www.newsweek.com/truth-were-all-raging-liars-78965
[https://perma.cc/9SS2-JUDY].
107 Jill Doner Kagle, Are We Lying to Ourselves About Deception?, 72 SOC.
SERV. REV. 234, 238 (1998).
108 Lisa Kern Griffin, Criminal Lying, Prosecutorial Power, and Social Meaning,
97 CALIF. L. REV. 1515, 1518-19 (2009).
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academic disciplines, and political discourse—we still know
very little about it. Recent developments in the social sciences
reveal how poorly deception is understood.109 It is tricky to
recreate clinically, and many of the published studies on its
nature and frequency fail to replicate.110 It turns out that it is
difficult to identify ground truths about lying itself, and it is
not nearly as straightforward of a concept as the rules around
it would suggest.
CONCLUSION
Because lying is both a pervasive act and a mysterious
concept, entirely predictable but impossible to detect with
precision, perhaps we should not regard it as so independently
consequential. Part of the work of the criminal justice system
is to make some determinations about who speaks honestly.
In many cases, that sorting will also support accurate
outcomes, but at times the focus on honesty enforcement will
obscure larger and more significant truths. Rooting out lies
and rewarding honesty are fine as far as they go, but they are
not enough to maximize accuracy. It may be easier to tell
whether someone has lied than whether all of the relevant
information has been gathered, but getting things right
remains the underlying value of the process. The most
important purpose of investigations and trials transcends lie
detection.
Finding facts, adjudicating guilt, and even
protecting the integrity of other public institutions require a
new balance that privileges engagement.
Both the procedures discussed here and the substantive
criminal law offer incremental opportunities to expand truthseeking. I take the system we have as a given, recognizing both
the power that law enforcement agents wield in investigations
and the persistence of the adversarial process. But the
limitations of common interrogation techniques, the costs of
the impeachment and confrontation rules, and the failures of
Daubert screening are increasingly apparent.
Some
interpretations of the lying offenses have also moved toward
imposing liability for lying only when the statements in
question introduce inaccuracy. Lying prosecutions can be
both over- and under-inclusive. Some targets of obstruction

109 See, e.g., ALDERT VRIJ, DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT: PITFALLS AND
OPPORTUNITIES 1–2 (2d ed. 2008).
110 See Daniel Engber, LOL Something Matters, SLATE (Jan. 3, 2018),
https://slate.com/health-and-science/2018/01/weve-been-told-were-living-ina-post-truth-age-dont-believe-it.html [https://perma.cc/9R5E-MQVN].
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cases do not merit prosecutorial resources,111 and other cases
narrow too quickly to proxy indictments when the underlying
criminality is of significant public concern and should give rise
to the substantive charges. A few recent decisions have shifted
in the direction of recognizing that not all lies are equally
deserving of criminal sanction. Cases concerning lies to get
elected,112 to claim unearned honors,113 and to obtain
citizenship114 suggest that there is more to determining when
dishonesty supports liability than the straightforward question
whether someone has uttered a falsehood. A binary approach
to “lying” has often masked vital evidence and silenced
witnesses, and a more pluralistic conception of “truth” as the
product of many voices and perspectives could help dislodge
some longstanding sources of error.
Clarity about the distinction between telling lies and the
status of empiricism is also vital because courts are now called
upon to perform a broader repair function. The fundamental
advantage of legal institutions is the background requirement
of engagement. In court, opposing parties are required to “join
issue,” and factfinders assess and reconcile their conflicting
accounts and interpretations of events.
Outside of the
courtroom, the divisions in public life increasingly involve
doubts about verifiable facts, and models for identifying and
agreeing to them are more essential than ever. Official
statements now seem so unreliable that there is little effort to
correct falsehoods or assess their impact, and journalists have
resorted to just counting how many thousands of times some
governmental figures lie.115 The lies may mean less and less,
but the crisis over shared facts matters.
The Oxford Dictionary’s 2016 word of the year was “posttruth,” which was defined as the “circumstances in which

111 See John R. Emshwiller & Gary Fields, For Feds, ‘Lying’ Is a Handy
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WALL
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PM),
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38294 [https://perma.cc/T2DM-RJVV].
112 See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2016).
113 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012); see also Genevieve
Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 2216 (2015)
(“[T]here is no historical tradition in the United States of prosecuting the act of
lying when that lie is unconnected to some other, legally cognizable harm . . . .”).
114 See Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017).
115 See Glenn Kessler, Salvador Rizzo & Meg Kelly, President Trump Has Made
3,001 False or Misleading Claims So Far, WASH. POST (May 1, 2018),
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objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion
than appeals to emotion and personal belief.”116 Even facts
that consist of numbers—crime rates, climate data, economic
indicators, trade deficits—do not stay stable across different
communities of interest.117 The problem of entitlement to
invented facts itself is not new. Ten years before “post-truth”
was declared a pivotal concept, Merriam-Webster’s word of the
year was “truthiness,” coined by comedian Stephen Colbert to
describe “the quality of preferring concepts or facts one wishes
to be true, rather than concepts of facts known to be true.”118
And even before that phrase entered the lexicon, political
operatives spoke dismissively of the policy prescriptions
favored by the “reality-based community.”119
Although the contested nature of ground truths did not
suddenly emerge, it does seem newly urgent. The volume and
influence of opinion over fact has increased. Empiricism and
expertise no longer generate consensus,120 and growing
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https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21706498-dishonestypolitics-nothing-new-manner-which-some-politicians-now-lie-and
[https://perma.cc/U2S5-TP6Y].
119 See Ron Suskind, Faith, Certainty and the Presidency of George W. Bush,
N.Y.
TIMES
MAG.
(Oct.
17,
2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/17/magazine/faith-certainty-and-thepresidency-of-george-w-bush.html [https://perma.cc/MBB7-LLCR]. Post-truth
technology, including sophisticated digital manipulation of video, has made the
slippery nature of objective facts still more acute. And the tethers come
completely undone when the discussion turns to the “simulation hypothesis”—
Elon Musk, for example, commented in 2016 that there is a “billion to one chance
we’re living in base reality.” Olivia Solon, Is Our World A Simulation? Why Some
Scientists Say It’s More Likely Than Not, GUARDIAN (Oct. 11, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/11/simulated-world-elonmusk-the-matrix [https://perma.cc/XQ94-QYNR].
120 See Atul Gawande, The Mistrust of Science, NEW YORKER (June 10, 2016),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-mistrust-of-science
[https://perma.cc/3YG4-XGSZ]; see also HARRY COLLINS, ARE WE ALL SCIENTIFIC
EXPERTS NOW? 131 (2014) (“If we start to believe we are all scientific experts,

2018]

HONESTY WITHOUT TRUTH

48

ambivalence about the nature of evidence itself is corroding
democratic norms.121 Carefully establishing facts and reliably
screening expertise in court could provide some counterweight
to the denigration of science and data in post-truth
discourse.122
Outside of the structured system of legal
institutions, “the most grossly obvious facts can be ignored
when they are unwelcome.”123 Of course, the adversarial
process causes some distortions, as do the cognitive biases of
prosecutors, judges, and jurors, but the core commitment of
investigation and adjudication is to identify objective truths.124
And finding right answers is a “fundamental goal of our legal
system.”125
Courtrooms can also play a pivotal role in preserving
democratic aspirations because—in contrast to fractured
media environments and polarized political discourse126¾the
ideas in question actually come into direct contact. Going to
court means leaving the echo chamber. Adversaries have to
sit in the same room. One has no choice but to recognize the
standing of others and to respond to claims. Witnesses take
oaths and must answer questions. Deliberately misleading the
court has potential criminal consequences. Evidentiary rules
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endeavor to screen out illegitimate sources of expertise, and
judges reject false claims of authority.127 Neutral factfinders
evaluate the quality of arguments and the consistency of
assertions. Advocates present data, to which decision makers
apply analytical thinking.
And the process generates
something agreed upon, or at least accepted, as a just
conclusion.
Truth “is not an absolute or a relative, but a skill—a
muscle, like memory—that collectively we have neglected so
much that we have grown measurably weaker at using it.”128
Courts can continue to exercise that muscle and build it up
again. Facts can change minds in court, and courts could
change minds about facts themselves. That will require
listening—to what suspects are really saying, to what all sorts
of witnesses want to reveal, and to data and science.
By addressing tensions between rules about honesty and
broader goals involving accuracy in the criminal justice
system, courts can better demonstrate epistemic competence
in the face of complexity and uncertainty. They can model
engagement with competing stories and many sources of
information. They can insist on shared realities and accepted
outcomes however strong adversary positions may be. By
finding common baselines despite intense conflict—producing
legitimate legal truth—courts could help restore reasoned
public discourse about facts.
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